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Abstract: 
 
An underlying understanding among adaptation and community-based natural resource 
management (CBNRM) scholars is the existence of important feedbacks between local resource 
management institutions and individual adaptive capacity. The relationship between CBNRM and 
individual adaptive capacity is of global concern given the ubiquity of CBNRM worldwide, the 
patent impacts of global changes at local levels,  and the recent calls for the integration of climate 
and rural development policies. So far, however, there have not been formal, large-n studies of 
that relationship. This study aims to fill that gap by testing whether the performance of 
community-based water management institutions and communal land regimes have an impact on 
the effectiveness of farmers’ adaptation responses to climatic and global market disturbances. For 
this purpose, the study relies on a unique dataset of individual and collective features obtained 
from water user associations (WUAs) and ejidos in Mexico. According to the regression results, 
well-functioning community-based water management institutions have a positive and significant 
impact on individual farmers’ self-reported response effectiveness. The impact of communal land 
property is also significant but negative. These effects, which hold only in the context of climate 
disturbances but not market disturbances, can be explained by looking at the support given by the 
associations to farmers, and issues of communal land marginalization, respectively.  Policies that 
strengthen the autonomy and capacity for cooperation of WUAs and ameliorate structural deficits 
in communal land regimes shall not only guarantee a long-advocated path for rural development 
but also help farmers deal with some of the climatic uncertainties that increasingly threaten 
agriculture. 
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1. Introduction   
Agriculture worldwide is increasingly exposed to a wide range of climatic and socio-economic 
pressures, including droughts, floods and plagues, input and crop price volatility and competition 
over land and water resources (Feola et al., 2015). This has raised concerns about meeting human 
demands for water and food (Godfray et al., 2010), and given rise to a substantial scholarship on 
farmer adaptation. A good number of adaptation scholars have focused on the factors that explain 
the willingness and capacity of individual farmers’ to respond to climate change and variability 
(Feola et al., 2015, Eakin et al., 2006, Pradhan et al., 2015, Eakin et al., 2014). Community-based 
natural resource management (CBNRM) scholars, on the other hand, have focused on 
understanding the capacity of local resource-dependent communities to manage their shared 
resources cooperatively, and on how socio-ecological disturbances impact that capacity and 
shape collective adaptations (Anderies et al., 2004, Fleischman et al., 2010, Cox, 2014, 
Villamayor-Tomas, 2014). An underlying understanding among authors from both traditions is 
the existence of important feedbacks between CBNRM and individual adaptive capacity (Adger, 
2003, Murtinho and Hayes, 2011, Armitage, 2005, Tompkins and Adger, 2004, Adger et al., 
2005). The relationship between CBNRM and individual adaptive capacity is of global concern 
given the ubiquity of CBNRM  worldwide, the patent impacts of global changes at local levels,  
and the recent calls for the integration of climate and rural development policies (Eakin et al., 
2014, Klein et al., 2005). So far, however, there have not been formal, large-n tests of that 
relationship.  
 
This paper aims to address that gap by looking at farmers’ responses to disturbances in 
community-based resource management regimes. The research questions that drive the research 
are: Are there identifiable patterns in the way farmers respond to different types of disturbances 
to their livelihoods? And, do community-based land and water management institutions affect the 
effectiveness of farmers’ responses? To answer these questions the study adopts an integrative 
approach to the study of adaptation, i.e., one that (1) observes both climatic and socio-economic 
disturbances (Tucker et al., 2010, Murtinho and Hayes, 2011), and (2) explains the adaptive 
capacity of farmers (i.e., their capacity to respond to disturbances effectively) and its relation to 
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CBNRM institutions by looking at proximate and more structural factors (Ribot, 2014, Eakin and 
Lemos, 2006).  
 
Empirically, the study relies on a multi-level set of data obtained from irrigation farmers and 
Water User Associations (WUAs) in Mexico. Studying farmer’s adaptive capacity in the context 
of Mexican irrigation systems is important for several reasons. Irrigated agriculture can represent 
a “win-win” solution to problems of environmental risk and poverty in rural areas in many 
countries, if proper natural resource management regimes are in place (Araral, 2013, Kerr, 2007). 
At the same time, irrigated agriculture –particularly in arid and semi-arid regions– is one of the 
economic activities where the impact of climatic and non-climatic events is most evident (Boken 
et al., 2005). Irrigation systems are managed by WUAs in many regions around the world. 
Indeed, much of the foundations of our current knowledge about community-based natural 
resource management relies on irrigation management studies (Agrawal, 2001, Poteete et al., 
2010). Mexico is a flagship case of the turn towards CBNRM that many developing countries 
have gone through in the last decades (Subramanian et al., 1997). The process of decentralization 
in the irrigation sector, which involved most notably the creation and empowerment of WUAs at 
the local level (Vermillion, 1997), has been profiled internationally as a policy success (Garces-
Restrepo et al., 2007, Rap and Wester, 2013). Also, the Mexican productive sector has been 
exposed to globalization, market liberalization, and climatic risk (Luers et al., 2003, Eakin, 
2005), which constitute a typical combination of disturbances in developing regions (Adger et al., 
2003, Eakin and Lemos, 2006). Finally, Mexico has one of the world’s highest proportions of 
agricultural land under communal property (the ejido system) --approximately 57% of the 
irrigable area-- which offers a unique opportunity to study the influence of different combinations 
of land and water property regimes on adaptation.  
2. Farmer adaptive capacity and community-based natural resource management 
Adaptation has been defined as “changes in processes, practices and structures to moderate 
potential damages or to benefit from opportunities associated with climate change” (McCarthy et 
al., 2001). Meanwhile, adaptive capacity (also referred to as adaptation capacity) concerns not the 
observed changes but the system’s predicted ability to carry out those actions to prepare and 
adapt to future disturbances (Smit and Wandel, 2006, Engle, 2011). Both, however, are intricately 
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related: as Smit and Wandel (2006: 287) put it, “adaptations are manifestations of adaptive 
capacity”. Hence, often adaptive capacity is analyzed ex-post based on the observed effectiveness 
of particular (adaptation) responses. 
 
The farming sector is particularly vulnerable to disturbances of different kinds, to which farmers 
need to adapt via a variety of responses. Much is known about the individual factors that 
contribute to the effectiveness of farmer adaptation responses. Two of the most cited factors 
include economic resources and access to relevant information. Economic resources protect 
farmers from debt traps in the aftermath of ecological disasters and allow them to opt for high-
cost adaptation investments or favored coping options (Cardona et al., 2012, Eriksen et al., 2005, 
Liu et al., 2008, Reidsma et al., 2010, Vásquez-León et al., 2003). Having the right information, 
whether climatic, technological or institutional, increases risk awareness and allows farmers to 
make strategic choices and planning in preparation for disturbances (Vásquez-León et al., 2003, 
Phillips, 2003, Patt and Gwata, 2002, Ziervogel, 2004, Nhemachena et al., 2014, Wheeler et al., 
2013). Less is known about the role of local collective action institutions, i.e., rules governing 
land and water resources, on the capacity of farmers to remain in business in the advent of 
disturbances. This gap is particularly noticeable in developing countries, where collective 
resource-management institutions are widespread (Agrawal, 2010), and where bottom-up 
adaptation experiences have traditionally been central to the resilience of vulnerable populations 
(Adger et al., 2003)  
 
Water, e.g., irrigation, is managed through community-based, water user associations (WUA) in 
many countries around the world (Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007). The main function of the 
associations is to guarantee that their members get the water they need in the right quantity and 
timing. This depends on the ability of the users, e.g., farmers, to design rules for collective 
decision-making, water allocation, infrastructure maintenance, and conflict-solving.  Monitoring 
and sanctioning ensure compliance with rules and therefore institutional performance (Meinzen 
Dick, 2007). In turn, institutional performance strengthens trust among the association members, 
makes their behavior more predictable and facilitates individual and collective planning (Ostrom 
and Walker, 2002, Ostrom, 1998, Folke et al., 2005, Grothmann and Patt, 2005). Droughts and 
other disturbance events increase the stakes over resource use and threaten the ability and 
willingness of users to cooperate (Blanco et al., 2015). In these contexts, enforcement can again 
5 
be particularly important to guarantee sufficient compliance levels and the robustness of the 
management system  (Villamayor-Tomas, 2014).   
 
Authors studying the interaction of irrigation management regimes and land property have 
pointed to a variety of issues, including the positive impact of tenure security on irrigation 
investments (Hodgson, 2004); the water use efficiency implications of the appropriation versus 
riparian water rights doctrines (Rosegrant and Gazmuri, 1995); the negative impacts of state-
promoted irrigation projects on land distribution and tenure security (Cotula, 2006);  the effects 
of land use changes on water quantity and quality in riparian areas (Meinzen Dick and Nkonya, 
2007);  and the management implications of uncoordinated land and water management policies 
(Meinzen Dick and Nkonya, 2007). With very few exceptions, however, the impact of communal 
and private property of land on irrigation management has been scarcely explored (Akudugu and 
Issahaku, 2013, Onyango et al., 2007). 
3. Methods 
 Methodologically, the paper falls in-between the positivist and constructivist approaches to 
adaptation (Ribot, 2014).  Risk is understood as a tangible by-product of specific natural and 
social disturbances. At the same we recognize that “risks do not directly reflect natural reality but 
are refracted in every society through lenses shaped by history, politics and culture” (Jasanoff 
1999, pp. 139; cited by Ribot 2014). 
 
Specifically, the paper unfolds as an “anatomy of adaptation” (Smit et al., 2000), which seeks to 
(1) answer the questions of to what farmers adapt (i.e. specific disturbances ), and how (i.e. 
specific adaptation responses) (Murtinho and Hayes, 2011); and (2) explain the effectiveness of 
those adaptation responses by looking at both proximate (e.g., WUA performance) as well as 
structural factors (Ribot, 2014). While the analysis does not look directly at adaptive capacity, we 
take the effectiveness of the observed adaptation responses as indirect evidence of it. 
 
Based on the reviewed theory, we expect WUA performance to positively affect farmer response 
effectiveness. We also expect that such effect holds after controlling for important farmer and 
Mexican context characteristics such as economic resources and information, and land tenure, 
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respectively. The analysis relies on interviews with multiple stakeholders and survey data 
collected among farmers from 7 irrigation systems in two Mexican valleys.  The data is first used 
to characterize the disturbances and responses identified by the farmers. Then, farmers’ self-
reported response effectiveness is explained via a logistic regression and discussed within the 
broader political economy context.  
3.1. Sampling  
The sampling of farmers followed a stratified and purposive selection strategy. The selection of 
valleys aimed at controlling for exposure to droughts. The valleys selected were the Yaqui Valle 
of Sonora and the Low Conchos Valley of Chihuahua, in Northwestern Mexico (see Figure 1 
below). With a semi-arid climate, the states have a long tradition of irrigation. Also, major 
droughts hit both valleys between the second half of the 1990s and in 2006, with shorter water 
scarcity episodes in between and after (Naylor et al., 2001).  
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Figure 1. Yaqui and Conchos valleys and selected irrigation systems 
 
Source: own elaboration based on data from CONAGUA, Irrigation District 090, Irrigation District 041 
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The selection of irrigation systems within each valley sought to control for the dominance of 
communal (i.e. ejido) versus private landholdings; and the cleavage between unidades vs. 
modulos (see Table 1). Current communal land systems in Mexico have their origins in the land 
reforms that  began in the 1930s, when the government decided to devolve land property rights to 
local communities via the organization of common property regimes (heretofore ejidos). In the 
1990s, as part of broad political and economic reforms and debates about the economic 
‘productivity’ of communal property (Muñoz Piña et al., 2003), the government promoted a 
series of legal changes to facilitate the privatization of  ejidos. The reforms have resulted in a 
mixed distribution of communal and private property land across irrigation systems.  
 
Table 1. Sampling strategy 
 Conchos Valley (CHIH) Yaqui Valley (SON) 
Exposure  Intensification, immigration, urban influence; 
droughts 
Economic decline, emigration, rural area; 
droughts 
Name of 
District (#) 
 Bajo Río Conchos (#090) (Not applicable; 
Unidades) 
Río Yaqui (#041) Colonias 
Yaqui 
(#018) 
Name of 
system 
Modulo 1 Modulo 3 Pueblito Maclovio Modulo K-91 Modulo 
Santini 1 
Bacum 
(locality) 
Property 
regime 
 Private 98%  Ejido 
68% 
Private 
90% 
Ejido 90% Private 
100% 
Ejido 90% Communal* 
100% 
Irrigated 
Area (has.) 
1,419 1,254 617 576 4,684 
 
4,721 ~1,000 
Number of 
irrigators 
203 130 91 106 335 850 NA** 
Irrigators 
surveyed 
25 23 19 27 25 31 18 
* In the course of fieldwork we found out that Bacum, and all other communities of the Yaqui tribe (Colonias Yaqui 
District), have a de facto private property regime in which 90% of all parcels are rented to mid- to large, non-Yaqui 
landowners, mostly from the nearby Yaqui District. 
** Official data about number irrigators in the Bacum case was not available; however, according to estimations 
from informants, the number of active irrigators is not bigger than 50.  
 
Traditional water management systems in Mexico, or Unidades de Riego (“irrigation units”, 
hereafter unidades), have traditionally enjoyed a great deal of autonomy. There are around 
23,000 unidades in Mexico (covering 2 million hectares) registered by the Federal Water Agency 
(CONAGUA), and around 17,000 unregistered ones (900,000 hectares) (CONAGUA, 2012). 
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State-promoted systems, also called Modulos de Riego (“irrigation modules”, hereafter modulos) 
date in most cases from the second half of the 20th Century, are grouped into bigger entities called 
Distritos de Riego (“irrigation districts”, hereafter Distritos), and have been under the tutelage of 
the federal government until the late 1990s, when the government transferred management rights 
at the modulo level. Currently, there are 85 distritos in Mexico, covering 3.5 million hectares 
(CONAGUA, 2012).  
 
We first carried out individual interviews with current and past WUA representatives, leaders of 
communities and ejidos, and CONAGUA and other governmental entities. We carried out a total 
of 33 interviews: 21 in Conchos (8 with government officials, and 13 with  leaders and ex-leaders 
of the irrigation associations and ejidos; and 12 in Yaqui (4 with government officials, 6 with 
leaders of the irrigation associations and ejidos, 1 with a private enterprise owner, and 1 with 
university professor). The purpose of the interviews was to obtain an initial characterization of 
the main disturbances and collective responses in each irrigation system. Emphasis was made on 
tracing the processes through which collective responses to specific disturbances were developed, 
including the main actors involved, the main facilitating factors and barriers faced, and the 
perceived outcomes of these responses. 
 
We then conducted the farmer survey in each of the seven irrigation systems. We aimed for a 
sample size of 25-30 farmers per system. Sampling was non-random due to the difficulties to 
have access to the entire population of farmers as well as to our interest in having enough 
representation of wealthier and poorer farmers. By these means we aimed at controlling for a 
potential selection bias in the assessments of collective water management and response 
effectiveness (see results section and Appendix A6 for a more detailed account of potential 
biases)1.  
 
                                                     
1 Wealthier resource users shall not only have more resources to defend their individual interests in collective 
management processes (Baland and Platteau, 1999, Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson, 2001) and therefore have 
disproportionately positive opinions about the performance of said processes, but also be less vulnerable to 
disturbances (Adger, 1999) and feel particularly effective in adapting to those. Thus, we requested WUA leaders to 
provide us with lists of big and small farmers. In some cases, the community leaders contacted the producers 
directly. 
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Our teams then set up appointments for the personalized delivery of the survey. Surveys were 
administered personally and in locations selected by the interviewees to maximize the response 
rate and to avoid biases associated to sensitive questions such as the evaluation of WUA 
performance. We completed 168 surveys out of the approximately 1,765 farmers within the 7 
irrigation systems (sampling error of 7.2%). 
3.2. Variables 
The survey addressed farmer and disturbances characteristics, and farmers’ responses to the 
disturbances. Farmers were asked to rank the top three most problematic disturbances they had 
faced in the last 10 years and report how they responded to each of those disturbances. The 
effectiveness of farmers’ responses was self-assessed by respondents based on 5 criteria, 
including whether the response (1) reached its objectives, (2) was implemented in a timely 
manner, (3) created negative externalities or (4) unattended effects, and (5) whether it would be 
used in the future (see Table A1 in Appendix for a list of all variables and survey items).  
 
Analyses that include many variables can describe complex phenomena accurately; however, too 
many explanatory variables or very complex explanations make theory less meaningful 
(Agrawal, 2001, Cox, 2008). In this study we aimed to balance our interest in understanding a 
complex phenomenon like adaptation, with the urge to avoid excessively-complex, “garbage-
can”, surveys and models (Achen, 2002). We did not aim to explain collective action, but its 
influence on individual adaptation, along with key individual controls. To measure the 
performance of collective management we relied on CPR theory, and collected data on 
satisfaction with key management processes and compliance with rules of different kinds. The 
individual farmer adaptation literature was also helpful in the variable selection process as it is 
particularly clear about the influence of economic resources and access to information on 
adaptation. We used farm size as a proxy for economic resources (Leclère et al., 2013, Soule et 
al., 2000); however, we also collected data on other related variables, such as economic 
dependence on irrigation, reliance on credit to cultivate, and whether the farmer had benefited 
from a government support program in the recent past. To assess the information variable, we 
collected data on both the type and number of information sources used by farmers.   
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4. Characterization of disturbances, and responses 
4.1. Water and market disturbances  
Figure 4 shows the most troubling disturbances as identified by farmers. Droughts were the most 
frequently mentioned disturbance in the surveys (21%), with minor differences across the two 
valleys (22% in the Conchos Valley, and 20% in the Yaqui Valley). The interviewed WUA and 
district representatives also pointed to droughts as the most important disturbance. Interviews 
also revealed a concern about reduction in water availability more generally. In the Yaqui valley, 
interviewees stressed that over the last 15 years, the winter rains, called equipatas, have 
completely disappeared. In the Conchos valley, interviewees tended to focus on the mismatch 
between allocated water use rights and water availability during droughts. Water availability in 
the area under study has indeed been recently affected by an increased competition over the 
resource due to the expansion of irrigation upstream of the valley, as well as the need to fulfill 
international water payment commitments with the US (Garrick et al., 2016).  
 
Figure 4. Frequency of disturbance reports by farmers in the Yaqui and Low Conchos 
valleys 
 
Note: the data here includes all reported disturbances, i.e., those ranked first, second and third in the survey.  
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The data also displays a wide range of other biophysical, mostly water-related, disturbances, and 
market-related disturbances (see Figure 4). Here, differences between the two valleys are clearer 
than in the case of droughts. Most notably, there is a significant difference in the frequency of 
flood reports (20% vs. 2% in the Conchos and Yaqui valleys, respectively; 99% confidence level 
as per chi-square and Fisher’s exact tests). This can again be associated to the international water 
payment commitments between Mexico and the US, which sometimes require quick reservoir 
releases of water beyond the carrying capacity of the river (Garrick et al., 2016). Also 
importantly, around 40% of the farmers in the Yaqui valley pointed to market disturbances while 
only 24% did it in the Low Conchos valley (significant difference at 99% confidence as per chi-
square and Fisher´s exact tests). This difference can be associated to the strong market-
integration of farmers in the Yaqui valley (Matson et al., 2005).  
 
According to the survey data, water-related disturbances had a significant impact on water 
distribution in the irrigation systems. Around 40% of respondents who reported water 
disturbances (see Figure 4) indicated a decrease in the performance of the water allocation in 
their irrigation system due to the disturbance. That was not the case for market-related 
disturbances (the percentage decreases to around 22%; the difference is significant at the 99% 
confidence level asper chi-square and Fisher’s exact test). Reports about the impact of water and 
market disturbances on farmers’ quota payments to their associations were much less frequent 
and not substantively different from each other (27% and  25%, respectively). This was expected 
given that farmers’ economic conditions and thus ability to pay the quotas is affected by aspects 
other than water productivity, such as crop market prices or input prices.  
 
Among the most frequently mentioned disturbances, “droughts” were disproportionately ranked 
as most troubling (58% of the times that “droughts” was mentioned); and “crop price volatility”, 
“increase in energy prices” and “increase in fertilizer prices” were disproportionately ranked as 
least troubling (58%, 53% and 55% of the times that those disturbances were mentioned, 
respectively). Not all farmers marked three disturbances; some of them (20) marked just two 
disturbances, generating missing data for the salience variable. Around 85% of such missing data 
concentrated on the “least troubling” value.  
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Around 66% of the farmers who reported droughts as the most troubling disturbance also 
reported freezes, floods or plagues as the second most troubling disturbance. As indicated by 
interviewees, droughts in the areas of study tend to come with higher temperatures in winter 
which contribute to the proliferation of plagues. Stagnant water shall remain for months in the 
fields after floods, which also makes crops more vulnerable to plagues, as well as to 
infrastructure issues in the advent of freezes. Similarly, much of the vulnerability of farmers to 
market disturbances was associated by interviewees to the removal or reduction of government 
subsidies and price controls, the opening of the economy to US imports after the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), as well as historical trends in oil prices (Fox and Haight, 2010, 
Naylor and Falcon, 2012). The ex-President of one of the irrigation associations in the Conchos 
valley, for instance,  noted that one of the main problems in his unit was commercialization, 
given the context of price instability, rising costs of inputs and declining government supports–
which he perceived as biased in favor of ‘those with money’. He linked these disturbances with 
poverty and out-migration, and in turn to decapitalization (abandoned lots). Similarly, different 
interviewees in the Yaqui valley complained about the “lack of government protection against 
global market prices” and how quickly global price falls translated in liquidity problems and 
decapitalization for certain farmers. Indeed, in our sample, just 48% of the poorer farmers (those 
with smaller farms) reported having received agricultural support from the government in the 
past, while 78% of the wealthier farmers reported such supports (significant difference at the 99% 
level as per chi-square and Fisher’s exact tests).  Additionally, 67% of all the reported market 
disturbances (and more than 75% of the “crop price volatility” and “increase in energy prices” 
disturbances) were identified by farmers from communal land-dominated irrigation systems (the 
remaining 33% were identified by farmers from private land-dominated systems; significant 
difference at 95% confidence level as per chi-square and Fisher’s exact tests).  
 
Finally, interview data points to couplings between water and market disturbances that produce 
wider-ranging effects. A frequently mentioned example in the Conchos valley was the confluence 
of droughts and punctuated crop price crises, like the one that partially provoked the collapse of 
the cotton production system in the late 1990s (Walsh, 2008). Interviewees also pointed how the 
land abandonment and impoverishment of certain groups of farmers had created difficulties to 
maintain the irrigation infrastructure in some systems due to lack of labor and non-compliance 
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with quota payments. Another example is the interaction between droughts and the progressive 
increase of fertilizer prices that farmers from both valleys have been facing since after the 
dismantlement of government support for agriculture in the early 1990s. 
4.2. Responses to disturbances 
Table 2 shows the measures developed by farmers in response to water, market and other 
disturbances. The main responses to droughts and other water disturbances are change in water 
use (14% of responses), change in farming strategies (12%), request external support (10%) and 
change in crops (9%). Change in water use involves increasing the time between watering events 
or shortening them, reduce overall water consumption, and diversify sources of water (e.g. by 
installing a water well). Change in farming strategies include harvesting earlier, using different 
plowing techniques to maintain soil moisture, leveling land and other techniques. The request 
external support refers mostly to the reliance on federal disaster relief programs. Change in crops 
involves switching from higher water-demand crops such as corn or even wheat to lower water 
demand crops such as safflower and fallow land. 
 
Table 2. Farmer responses to different types of disturbance  
 Water 
disturbances 
Market 
disturbances 
Freeze, Plagues, and 
other disturbances 
Change crops 9% 1% 2% 
Change in water use 14% 2% 7% 
Request external support 10% 15% 5% 
Changes in farming strategies 12% 7% 4% 
Reduce agricultural inputs 0% 13% 1% 
Look for new markets 1% 11% 1% 
Look for credit 2% 10% 0% 
Decapitalization 4% 3% 1% 
New investments 2% 1% 6% 
Other economic activity 1% 1% 1% 
Increase fertilizers 0% 2% 3% 
Increase pesticides 1% 1% 29% 
Increase production 0% 2% 0% 
Insurance 0% 1% 4% 
Does not know 5% 3% 5% 
No adaptation response* 37% 27% 28% 
TOTAL (n) 211 151 134 
Note: The data includes the main response to each of the 3 (in some occasions 2) disturbances the sampled farmers 
identified. See Table A2 in Appendix for an expanded version with the disturbances disaggregated.  
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*A number of farmers reported no responding in any specific manner but just waiting and hoping for normal 
conditions to restore. Quotes included, from “I did not take any measures” and “I did not do much, just wait”, to  
“what is one supposed to do?”, or “there is no response against freezes”. 
 
Request external support and changes in agricultural techniques, were also frequently used to 
cope with market disturbances. Indeed external support was the most frequently mentioned 
response against market disturbances (15%).  Other popular responses to market disturbances 
include reduce agricultural inputs (13%) such as fertilizer, gas, seeds and capital investments; 
look for new markets (11%), which involves looking for new crop buyers and intermediaries, and 
marketing agricultural byproducts (e.g., hay for fodder); and credit (10%), which refers to the 
recourse to new, both formal and informal, sources of credit, and loan overdraft. 
 
Regarding responses to other disturbances, almost the totality of the increase pesticide responses 
(29%) addressed the plagues disturbance. Responses to freezes, were quite evenly distributed, 
including insurance, request external support, change farming strategies, and new investments. 
Finally, a considerable percentage of irrigators reported not having implemented any response. 
This percentage reached 37% for water disturbances, and decreased to 27% and 28% for market 
and other disturbances, respectively. 
 
Generally, famers self-assessed their responses as effective. This result was somehow expected: 
the sample included only farmers who are still in business and have enjoyed some minimum level 
of success in adapting to disturbances. That said, only 56% of all farmers who reported responses 
to droughts were fully satisfied (i.e., a positive scoring in all evaluative criteria). As shown in 
Figure 5, there were no notable differences between the effectiveness scores across disturbances. 
Responses to water infrastructure issues were assessed the most positively (71% of farmers who 
faced this disturbance were fully satisfied with their responses), followed by responses to floods, 
increased water fees and increased salinity (67% of farmers were fully satisfied with their 
responses to each disturbance). Responses to increased water demand, increased price fertilizers, 
increased energy prices and marketing problems scored the lowest (50% each).  
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Figure 5. Percentage of farmers reporting full response effectiveness for different 
disturbances  
 
Note: The “less access to credit” disturbance is not included due to lack of data (n=1). The number of observations 
for each disturbance is in parenthesis. 
 
A focus on the case of droughts during the interviews revealed the existence of a number of 
collective responses (technical, capacity-building, institutional and political) developed by the 
irrigation associations (see Table A3 in Appendix). Technical responses consisted mostly of 
infrastructure improvements with the support of CONAGUA and the Federal Department of 
Agriculture (SAGARPA), either directly (in the case of unidades) or indirectly through the 
distritos (in the case of modulos and Bacum). An example of the capacity-building responses is 
the training programs developed by the government in collaboration with irrigation associations 
for improving the efficiency of cropping and irrigation practices. Two important institutional 
responses developed by CONAGUA in both valleys consisted on the ad hoc reduction of water 
rights to irrigation systems during severe droughts (in 2002-2003), and the permanent prohibition 
of cultivating more than two crops per year. An example of institutional responses at the District 
level (in District 41) is the reduction from 5 to 4 the number of irrigation turns allocated to 
farmers to guarantee that enough water remains until the end of the irrigation campaign during 
droughts. Other collective responses include the strengthening of information sharing and water 
use monitoring and sanctions, and the use of incentives to promote best irrigation practices. 
Finally, political responses consist mainly of claims of liability and lobbying activities carried out 
by the irrigation associations to guarantee that public authorities respect their water use rights in 
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the advent of droughts or competing water uses, and that disaster and other funds are allocated in 
a timely manner. 
5. Regression analysis of farmers’ response effectiveness scores 
To explain farmers’ self-reported scores of response effectiveness we carried a series of logit 
regression models. In order to maximize variation, response effectiveness was operationalized as 
a dummy, where 1 = all effectiveness indicators are positive, and 0 = at least one effectiveness 
indicator is negative (see Table A4 in Appendix for alternative operationalizations).  All the 
variables were also coded as dummies to facilitate interpretation (see Tables A5 in Appendix for 
detailed description). All models included dummies and robust cluster errors to control for the 
hierarchical nature of the dataset (farmers grouped into systems and valleys) (Cameron and 
Miller, 2015).  
 
Given that the irrigation systems were not selected randomly, the statistical significance of the 
models and coefficients should be taken with caution, i.e., as a representation of the 7 systems 
and similar systems rather than as a general pattern. Also, the farmer sample size was just 
appropriate (sampling error = 7.2% at 95% confidence level) which also entails representation 
issues.  Moreover, our analysis was particularly vulnerable to three types of well-recognized 
biases in social science research, to wit, selection-bias (Cook and Campbell, 1979), omitted 
variable bias (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008) and self-report bias (Podsakoff and Organ, 
1986). As further explained in the Appendix (A6), we aimed to downplay those biases by 
combining the stratified sampling, the cluster errors modelling, and the use of multiple 
measurement items, among other strategies. 
 
We ran three models explaining farmers’ response effectiveness scores against water disturbances 
(droughts, floods, increased water demand, high temperatures), market disturbances (marketing 
problems, increased energy prices, crop price volatility, increased price of fertilizers, decreased 
governmental support), and all disturbances (Table 3). As shown in Model 1, response 
effectiveness scores to droughts and other water disturbances are higher in WUAs that perform 
very satisfactorily and is lower in systems with predominance of communal land. Being a 
wealthier farmer has a positive impact on response effectiveness, while having depended from 
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government support in the past and relying on a diversity of information sources has a negative 
impact; however, none of these variable is statistically significant. Also, the benevolence of 
disturbances (i.e., whether farmers ranked them as least problematic) has positive and significant 
effects; and farmers who are located in the Conchos valley significatively report lower 
effectiveness scores than those in the Yaqui valley.  
 
Table 3. Logistic regression models of farmers’ response effectiveness scores 
VARIABLES M1: Water 
disturbances 
M2: Market 
disturbances 
M3: All 
disturbances 
System and farmer features    
WUA Performance  1.354* 0.578 1.224*** 
 (0.630) (0.883) (0.211) 
Communal land -0.914*** -0.537 -0.613** 
 (0.135) (0.452) (0.128) 
Economic resources (large farm) -0.629 1.726*** 0.435 
 (0.514) (0.380) (0.259) 
Information diversity   0.0187 -0.689* -0.441 
 (0.485) (0.290) (0.343) 
Controls    
Government support recipient 0.0727 -1.872*** -0.470 
 (0.868) (0.548) (0.446) 
Disturbance benevolence  0.747*** 0.426 0.291** 
 (0.241) (0.349) (0.139) 
Valley (Conchos) -1.973*** -1.027** -1.093** 
 (0.228) (0.418) (0.183) 
Constant 0.789* 0.956* 0.834*** 
 (0.477) (0.569) (0.243) 
R2 0.21 0.16 0.10 
Observations 109 82 256 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (note that these errors are only approximate; the errors used to make inference 
were recalculated following Webb’s (2013) procedure, which were bigger than those in this table. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note 1: Observations in these models are not farmers but responses to disturbances (see also note to Table 2 above).     
Note 2: Model 1 was tested including also freezes, floods and plagues with very similar results; however, qualitative 
data did not allow us to understand the mechanisms through which WUAs contribute to response effectiveness 
against those disturbances so we decided to add them in an “all disturbances” model (M3) instead. 
Note 3: We also run alternative models including economic dependence on irrigation and reliance on credit for 
cultivation as individual level controls (see Table A1 to see survey items, and Table A5 for descriptive statistics). 
These variables did not have a substantive nor statistically significant impact and the results with regard to the other 
variables did not change.  
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As shown in Model 2, neither WUA performance nor land property have a strong impact on 
response effectiveness scores in the context of market disturbances. Coefficients of both variables 
point in the same direction than in Model 1; however, the significance, is considerably lower in 
Model 2 both substantively and statistically. Alternatively, having economic resources (i.e., large 
farm), having benefited from governmental support programs, and having access to a diversity of 
information sources both have a strong and significant effect. The impact of being recipient of 
government support is negative, which can be interpreted in light of the recent decrease of said 
support and neoliberal reforms in Mexico. As further discussed below, farmers used to receiving 
governmental support would be more vulnerable to the economic disturbances stemming from 
the new neoliberal context than those accustomed to operate without such support. The effect of 
information diversity is also negative. This unexpected result can be further qualified. The most 
popular sources of information in this subsample were the “media” (50%), “neighbors” (38%), 
the WUA (30%) and the “government” (18%). None of these variables had a significant impact 
when added to the model via dummies; however the “neighbors”, “media” and “government” 
variables had a negative impact, while the WUA variable had a positive one.   
  
Table 4. Predicted impact on response effectiveness  
 Water disturbances Market disturbances All disturbances 
WUA performance +27% -- +24% 
Communal land -21% -- -15% 
Economic resources (large farm) -- +40% -- 
Information diversity -- -18% -- 
Government support recipient -- -41% -- 
Benevolence +30% -- +14% 
Valley (Conchos) -40% -25% -23% 
Note: probability changes have been calculated only for the statistically significant variables. The scores represent 
percentage change in probability of effectiveness, holding all the other variables at their means. 
 
Table 4 reports predicted impact of the model variables on response effectiveness. According to 
the estimations, farming in a highly performing WUA would increase the chances of response 
effectiveness against droughts and other water disturbances by 27% on average, while doing it in 
a communal land-dominated system or in the Conchos valley would decrease response 
effectiveness by 21% and 40% respectively. In the context of market disturbances, the 
importance of resource management institutions would be superseded by farmer features, 
including differences in economic resources, having depended on government support in the past, 
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and having access to different sources of information. Wealthier farmers (larger farm sizes) have 
an average of 40% higher chance of having an effective response than poorer farmers; while 
farmers relying on more than one source of information and farmers having depended on 
government support in the past have up to 18% and 41% lower chances, respectively.  
 
By the same token, the average predicted probability of responding effectively to disturbances 
shall vary considerably depending on different combinations of farmer and collective features 
and the type of disturbance. For example, the probability that farmers respond effectively to 
water disturbances could range from to 30% in a communal-dominated system in the Conchos 
valley (like the cases of “Maclovio” and “Modulo 3”) if this were managed by a low-performing 
WUA, to 97% in a system dominated by private land in the Yaqui valley (like the case of 
“Modulo K91”) if this were managed by a highly-performing WUA. Also, wealthier farmers who 
did not depend on government support in the past and rely on one source of information would 
have around 95% chances of being effective against market disturbances, while poorer farmers 
who depended on government support in the past and rely on multiple sources of information 
would have a 37% chance.  
6. Discussion  
Overall, the above findings support but also qualify expectations about the contribution of 
community-based resource management institutions to farmer adaptive capacity. The paragraphs 
that follow discuss the findings with regard to the distinction between water and market 
disturbances, the scope of cooperative measures developed within the context of WUAs, and the 
political-economic context of communal land management in Mexico and other developing 
countries.    
6.1. Coupled natural resource and global market disturbances  
Rural populations in developing regions are typically exposed to a number of socio-economic 
disturbances –market volatility, changing policies and other political economy conditions– that 
add to the potential impacts of climate changes (Eakin and Lemos, 2006, Turner et al., 2003). In 
these contexts, farmers may not perceive climatic disturbances as particularly threatening or more 
problematic than other disturbances (Eakin, 2005). Just 43% of the farmers in this study showed 
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concern about natural resource (i.e., water) related disturbances, which was not expected given 
the recent history of water shortages in both valleys and the strong dependence of farmers on 
water.  It is likely that the effectiveness of past responses to droughts (Barrios et al., 2009) and/or 
a process of normalization (Tucker et al., 2010), have reduced sensitivity of farmers to climate 
events. However, it is also likely that farmers are less prone to fear those events when 
experienced in combination with other events such as market changes. Indeed, resource and 
market disturbances are more frequently interlinked than not, “such that it is very difficult to 
separate impacts or to ascribe independent stimuli for adaptations” (Smit et al., 1996). As further 
illustrated below (see sections 6.3 and 6.4), the couplings between punctuated droughts and 
floods on the one hand, and decreasing terms of trade on the other, can be felt at both the farm 
and community levels, and unfold through complex mechanisms.  
6.2. Grappling with adaptation and development? 
Adaptive capacity cannot be considered simply an issue of the ability of individuals, i.e., farmers, 
to just adapt to pertinent risks, but rather to engage in livelihood activities that guarantee both 
their economic development and resilience in the long term (Eakin, 2005, Adger et al., 2003). In 
our analysis, farmer responses tended to cluster around resource (mostly water) disturbances and 
market disturbances. Water disturbances were mostly addressed via water conservation strategies, 
while market disturbances were tackled mostly via cost-saving, financial and product innovation 
strategies. Trade-offs between adapting to the two types of disturbances revealed tensions, some 
of which echo the dichotomy between adaptation to climate events and longer-term sustainable 
development (Brown, 2011, Eriksen and O'BRIEN, 2007, Klein et al., 2005). As pointed out by 
farmers, the change of crops in the advent of droughts, i.e. from high to low water demand and 
value crops, reduces the capacity of farmers to generate revenue, and in turn decreases their 
chances to access credit to cope with the decreased profitability of agriculture (see Table A2 in 
Appendix)2. Similarly, the strategy of reducing agricultural inputs to cope with increased 
fertilizer and energy prices is in conflict with that of investing in new farming strategies such as 
leveling the land to better cope with floods, or the need to increase the use of use pesticides to 
cope with plagues.  
                                                     
2 This finds historical evidence in the Conchos valley, where the cotton crisis and subsequent droughts pushed 
farmers to switch from cotton to lower-value crops making them financially more vulnerable to global market threats 
and ultimately paving the way for the economic decline of the valley (Walsh, 2008) 
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Despite these trade-offs, the data also points to the potential synergies among responses within 
the same disturbance cluster. Water management changes, for example, are effectively used to 
cope with droughts and increases in water demand, as well as infrastructure issues (e.g. 
maintaining irrigation canals) and temperature raises (see “changes in water use” Table A2 in 
Appendix). Similarly, the search of new sources of funding and markets are used to cope with the 
increase in the price of fertilizers and energy, as well as market access difficulties, or the lack of 
governmental support. Although these synergies do not necessarily ameliorate the trade-offs, they 
provide guidance to design and implement climate-adaptation and development policies. 
6.3. Sustaining community-based water institutions and specific adaptive capacity  
The positive relationship between the performance of WUA institutions and the effectiveness of 
farmer adaptation responses to water disturbances illustrates the existence of important feedbacks 
from the collective level to the individual level and the importance of integrating the study of 
adaptation and natural resource governance (Murtinho and Hayes, 2011). The main role of the 
studied WUAs is to guarantee that farmers are not limited by water-related issues in their 
agricultural activities, which includes adapting to climatic disturbances. The insights gained 
through the interviews about how the WUAs manage droughts are illustrative of such role (see 
also Table A3 in Appendix). First, WUA cadres collect information about climate conditions, 
measures to improve water use, and government programs that can contribute to finance those 
measures. This information is in turn shared in assemblies as well as through everyday 
interactions and written communications. Second, the enforcement of water appropriation rules 
increases the reliability of water availability in the systems and, in turn, the capacity of farmers to 
plan for adaptation investments. Finally, WUA financing rules provide a way to pool labor and 
monetary resources to maintain the irrigation infrastructure and develop new infrastructure in the 
advent of disturbances. All of these functions have been documented in previous studies to 
explain the ability of resource-dependent communities to avoid resource overexploitation 
(Ostrom, 1990, Meinzen Dick, 2007), and  develop collective adaptations (Murtinho and Hayes, 
2011), but had not been related so far to individual adaptive capacity. The distinction between 
generic and specific adaptation capacities (Lemos et al., 2013, Eakin et al., 2014) can be useful 
for that purpose. Generic capacities include structural aspects such as income, health and 
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education level, and are usually associated to development policies. Specific capacities, in turn, 
are tailored to particular risks (e.g., access to water supply and conservation solutions in the 
advent of droughts) and have usually been the focus of climate change adaptation policies (Eakin 
et al., 2014). According to the evidence from this study, WUAs can play a key role as providers 
of specific adaptive capacity (i.e., to cope with water-related climatic disturbances). However, as 
discussed in the next section, the relationship between CBNRM and adaptive capacity is not just 
one-way. 
6.4. Communal land property and poverty dynamics 
The negative association between communal land property and the effectiveness of adaptation 
responses to water disturbances hints at the importance of generic adaptive capacity and the 
complex paths through which it affects climate change adaptation. In this study, ejido farmers 
performed worse than the rest when adapting to water issues, even after discounting the effect of 
WUA management institutions and economic resources. Structural factors such as difficulties in 
obtaining access to credit and inputs, lack of governmental support, poverty, and tenure 
insecurity, have been shown to constrain agricultural productivity in communal lands in 
developing countries (Palmer and Bennett, 2013, Kerekes and Williamson, 2010, Logan and 
Moseley, 2002, Gyasi, 1994, Robson and Nayak, 2010). In the Mexican irrigation context, 
authors have additionally pointed to the undue influence of some farmers over water allocation, 
the management challenges of dealing with a large numbers of small farmers, and the difficult 
access to credit, improved seeds and other resources (Liverman, 1999, Alvarado, 2008, Turner et 
al., 2003, Vásquez-León et al., 2003). As reported by interviewees in our ejido cases, the small 
size of farms (usually less than 5 ha per farmer) hinders the development of scale economies and 
investments in technological or infrastructural improvements, such as drip irrigation or the 
leveling of land; and the impoverishment of farmers creates infrastructure maintenance issues. 
So, although the lower response effectiveness of farmers in communal lands holds even after 
controlling for economic assets, these still matter, as a large number of small, impoverished 
farmers may affect the effectiveness of other farmers indirectly through their impact on the 
performance of water user associations.  
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In contrast to these results, we did not find conclusive evidence about the impact of WUA 
performance or communal land on the effectiveness of farmer adaptation responses in the context 
of market disturbances. This can be related to the very nature of those disturbances. On the one 
hand, it seems intuitive that WUAs are less concerned with issues that are related to the private 
assets of farmers rather than with water or other common pool resources. On the other hand, as 
further developed in the next section, market disturbances can be associated to the recent history 
of economic liberalization in the country, which has affected individual farmers and ejidos 
simultaneously. Thus, it is expected that, struggling with the same underlying background of 
events, ejido organizations play little role in farmer’s adaptive capacity.  Still, our market 
disturbance model shows a strong positive impact of economic resources on response 
effectiveness, which points again to the importance of generic adaptive capacity.  
6.5. Market disturbances and the withdrawal of the state  
Lastly, as pointed by other scholars, it is imperative that analyses of adaptive capacity go beyond 
identifying local proximate factors (e.g. resource use and management, economic resources), to 
identifying how these factors come to be produced –i.e. the larger-scale, underlying political-
economic conditions which mediate how resources and power are distributed– as well as to 
understanding farmers’ ability to alter these conditions (Eriksen et al., 2015, Ribot, 2014). Both 
the exposure of farmers to market disturbances and the adaptive capacity deficits in communal 
lands can be traced back to the land and economic reforms carried out by the Mexican 
government since the 1990s. PROCAMPO, the main program to compensate farmers for the 
NAFTA agreement and the opening of the economy to global exports, has ended up 
disproportionally benefiting mid to large farmers and agribusiness, and thus has done little to 
offset the higher loss of higher crop prices and impoverishment of  small farmers (Fox and 
Haight, 2010). The banking reforms affected BANRURAL (National Rural Credit Bank), 
reducing expenditures on subsidized credit, making it harder for small private and communal 
land farmers to obtain loans (Turner et al., 2003). Finally, the constitutional reform and the land-
titling program PROCEDE in the 1990s facilitated the formalization of private land rights within 
communal land systems and fostered out-migration from rural areas (De Janvry et al., 2015). This 
in turn jeopardized the capacity of communal land organizations to carry their daily operations 
and weakened the adaptive capacity of remaining communal resource users (Vásquez-León et al., 
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2003, Robson and Berkes, 2011). In our study, multiple sources of evidence point to the negative 
influence of the above political economy conditions on adaptive capacity. As pointed in section 
5.1, much of the vulnerability of certain farmers to market disturbances (e.g., the increase in input 
prices, volatility of prices) was associated by interviewees to the reduction of government support 
and the liberalization of the economy. Also, according to the survey data, poorer farmers have 
lower access to government support and, together with farmers who depended on such support in 
the past and ejido farmers, are less effective in coping with the consequences of the liberalized 
market.   
7. Conclusions 
This study contributes in two original ways to the study of adaptation to regionally- and globally-
linked changes in rural contexts. First, it offers an inventory and systematic analysis of 
disturbances of different nature. Water and other climatic disturbances are perceived as a 
relatively salient problem, which is intuitive given the irrigated agriculture context; however, 
there are also a large number of other disturbances, many of which can be associated to the recent 
political economy history of Mexico and other developing countries in the era of globalization. 
We found couplings between water disturbances and global market disturbances, as well as trade-
offs between responding to one type of disturbance or the other; however, we also found 
promising synergies among responses to water disturbances and among responses to market 
disturbances. Second, the study tackles cross-scale adaptation dynamics by looking at the 
influence of communal land property and the performance of water user associations (WUAs) on 
the response effectiveness of farmers. Here we shed light on the provision of water-specific 
adaptive capacity by WUAs to farmers, and the negative impact that structural deficits associated 
to the liberalization reform and its impact on communal land property regimes have on farmers’ 
generic adaptive capacity.  
 
The reduced intervention of the state and concomitant decentralization of decision making at 
local levels have given rise to new spaces for action in developing countries but also left rural 
local communities fully exposed to globalization threats. From this perspective, it is contradictory 
that the state reduces its role in agricultural development policy while simultaneously reinvesting 
in climate change adaptive capacity. Paradoxically enough, this is particularly prevalent in 
developing countries, where those development policies are most needed. Reversing this trend 
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means a far closer integration between adaptation programs and redistribution policy that is often 
supposed. Policies that strengthen the autonomy and capacity for cooperation of WUAs and 
ameliorate structural deficits in communal land regimes shall not only guarantee a long-
advocated path to sustainable development, but also help farmers deal with some of the climatic 
uncertainties that persistently and increasingly threaten agriculture. 
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Appendices 
Table A1. Survey items and variables 
Variable Survey items Operationalization  
Response effectiveness How did you respond to the identified 
disturbance? Did your response accomplish its 
objectives/apply on time/have any unattended 
negative issue on your agricultural 
activity/create externalities on other farmers? 
Would it be useful to cope with the disturbance 
in the future? Would you recommend it? 
1=the response 
accomplished its 
objectives, was applied on 
time, did not have any 
unattended effects, did not 
create problems to other 
farmers, would be 
applicable in the future, 
and is recommendable; 
0=the response did not 
fulfill one or more of the 
above criteria  
Valley -- 0=Yaqui valley; 
1=Conchos valley 
Disturbance benevolence  Out of the following list of adverse events, 
which ones were the most problematic in the 
last ten years? Please mark the three most 
problematic, from 1 (most problematic) to 3 
(least problematic).   
1=first ranked event 
2=second ranked event 
3=third ranked event 
WUA Performance  
 
How well do farmers in this system comply 
with water allocation/fee payment/assistance to 
meetings?  
Are you satisfied with the following aspects 
related to water administration in your system? 
(Quantity of water allocation/timing of water 
allocation/infrastructure maintenance/conflict 
solving) 
1= all types of rules are 
“well” followed by farmers 
and satisfied with all water 
administration aspects;  
0=any type of rule is 
“irregularly” or “badly” 
followed by farmers or 
and/or not fully satisfied 
with all water 
administration aspects 
Communal land  -- 1=majority of land in 
system is communally 
owned; 
0=majority of land is 
privately owned 
Information  Which of the following information sources do 
you rely on to get updates on agricultural 
matters? (Radio/conversations/local 
authorities/Distrito/Looking at other 
farmers/public authorities/ejido 
committee/internet/CONAGUA/modulo/unidad/ 
NGO/family/other) 
0= rely on one source of 
information; 1= rely on 
more than one source of 
information  
Economic resources 
(large farm) 
How many hectares of land have you usually 
cultivated in the last decade?  
1=farmer usually cultivates 
more than 20 hectares;  
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 0=farmer usually cultivates 
less than 20 hectares  
Government support 
recipient 
Have you received monetary support in the past 
from the government or other governmental 
agencies for aspects related to your agricultural 
activity?  
1=yes;  
0=no 
Dependence on irrigation Which part of your income corresponds to the 
following activities (nothing, a bit, half, most of 
it,  all of it)? (irrigation farming, dryland 
farming, cattle, employee in the 
services/industry sector, not agricultural own 
business)  
1=all the income 
corresponds to irrigation 
farming;  
0=at least a bit of the 
income corresponds to an 
activity that is not 
irrigation farming. 
Dependence on credit Do you usually ask for credit in order to 
cultivate your field? 
1=yes;  
0=no 
 
Table A2. Percentage of disturbance instances addressed by different responses  
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Change crops    4 3  33     13 5  3  
Change water use    4     22 23 29 19 2  15  
Request external support 33 29 22 12 3 8   56 8 21 8 3  6 60 
Change farming  7 6 4 19 2    15  7 28 3 6  
Reduce inputs  14  12 22 14      1   2  
Look for new markets   50 4  14        2 2  
Request credit  21   6 20  67    1 2    
Decapitalize  7 6 4  2      8   3  
New investments     6 0 33     4  3 8  
Other economic activity      4      3  2 2  
Increase fertilizers    8  2        2 5  
Increase pesticides      2 33   8    57 2 20 
Increase production    8  2      1     
Insurance    4  2      1   9  
No response 67 14 17 35 31 27  33 22 46 43 32 48 25 32 20 
TOTAL disturbances (n) 3 14 18 26 32 49 3 3 9 13 14 106 60 63 66 5 
In grey: percentages that are not very meaningful given the low number of observations (see TOTAL disturbances 
figures in italics) 
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Table A3. Collective responses carried through the WUA 
Case type Case Responses during drought* 
Private 
property, 
Module 
 
Module 1 
(District 90, 
Conchos) 
Technical 
- Improvements in irrigation canals 
- Leveling lands 
Institutional 
- Penalties for non-payment of water dues 
- Water transfers from other modules in district 
Political 
- Lobby CONAGUA for increase in water volume (guarantee rights) 
Module K-91 
(District 41, 
Yaqui) 
Technical 
- Improvements in irrigation canals 
- Leveling lands 
- Water pumps to reuse water 
- Building water wells 
Institutional 
- Restrictions in irrigation turns 
- Penalties for non-payment of water dues 
- Increasing monitoring & enforcement of rules 
Political 
- Fight against new inter-region water transfer project 
Collective 
property, 
Module 
 
Module 3 
(District 90, 
Conchos) 
Technical 
- Improvements in irrigation canals 
Santini Module 
(District 41, 
Yaqui) 
Technical 
- Improvements in irrigation canals 
- Water pumps to reuse water 
- Building water wells 
Capacity building  
- Participation in program technical advice program (RIGRAT) provided by 
CONAGUA 
Institutional 
- Restrictions in irrigation turns 
- Increasing monitoring and enforcement of rules 
Political 
- Fight against new inter-region water transfer project 
Private 
property, 
Units 
Pueblito 
(Conchos) 
 
Technical 
- Improvements in irrigation canals 
Institutional 
- Penalties for non-payment of water dues 
- Increasing monitoring & enforcement of rules 
Collective 
property, 
Units   
Maclovio 
(Conchos) 
 
Technical 
- Improvements in irrigation canals 
Political 
- Lobby CONAGUA to introduce flexibility in one-season cropping 
Collective 
property, 
CONAGUA 
(outlier) 
Bacum 
Community 
(District 18, 
Yaqui) 
Political 
- Fight against new inter-region water transfer project  
* Excludes two government-mandated responses: Reducing water availability, done during one extreme drought in 
each valley (applied in all cases except in the Bacum community), and reducing annual crop cycles from two to one 
(applied in all cases). 
** All aspects directly related to water management are handled by a private company hired by CONAGUA. 
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Table A4. Different operationalizations of response effectiveness 
Variable Operationalization  Min/Max Mean p25/p50 Std CV 
Full effectiveness (see Table A1) 0/1 0.59 0/1 0.49 0.83 
Average effectiveness Average of 6 effectiveness 
indicators 
0/1 0.87 0.8/1 0.21 0.24 
Ordinal effectiveness Sum or 6 effectiveness indicators 0/6 5.2 5/6 1.23 0.24 
Log of ordinal 
effectiveness 
Log of sum of 6 effectiveness 
indicators 
0/1.79 1.61 1.6/1.79 0.34 0.21 
Note: As shown by the measures of central tendency, data is positively skewed. “Full effectiveness” results in the 
highest coefficient of variation. 
 
Table A5. Descriptive statistics of WUA and farmer variables 
Variable Mean Median Std Min/max n 
WUA performance 0.24 0 0.48 0/1 151 
Communal land 0.59 1 0.49 0/1 168 
Economic resources (large farm) 0.30 0 0.49 0/1 168 
Information 0.48 1 0.94 1/4 168 
Government support recipient 0.57 1 0.49 0/1 168 
Irrigation dependence 0.49 0 0.49 0/1 167 
Dependence on credit 0.4 0 0.49 0/1 165 
Note 1: the number of observations reflects the number of farmers surveyed, not the number of observations included 
in the analysis. The sample used in the regression analysis included  between 234 and 293 observations (responses to 
disturbances), depending on the variables included in the analysis (i.e., missing data) 
 
A6. Commentary on selection, omitted variable and self-report biases 
Our analysis was particularly vulnerable to three types of well-recognized biases in social science 
research (Cook and Campbell, 1979). One is  selection bias. As our samples were partially pre-
selected by leaders of the irrigation associations, there was the risk that  farmers’ assessments of 
irrigation management and response effectiveness were biased upward. Our strategy of stratifying 
the sample by wealth was one way to cope with that bias (see section 3.1). Additionally, we 
relied on a relatively large number of survey items to assess WUA performance (7) and response 
effectiveness (6), which expectedly contributed to further reduce the bias. Indeed, correlations 
between the WUA performance items and farm size (i.e., a proxy for economic resources) varied 
considerably depending on the item (5 not significant correlations and 2 significant correlations at 
95% confidence level; minimum correlation=-0.001, and maximum correlation=0.176). The same 
occurred with the response effectiveness items (4 not significant correlations and 2 significant 
correlations at 95%; minimum correlation=-0.079, and maximum correlation=0.126).   
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Second, there was a potential omitted variables bias, meaning that unobserved features that were 
common to the population of farmers in a case or a valley were correlated to the dependent and 
explanatory variables. That would prevent us from generalizing across the cases. To minimize 
that risk we followed combined robust cluster errors and dummy variables. Specifically we used 
dummies to control for valley effects, and used clustered errors to control for WUA effects 
(Cameron and Miller, 2015, Roodman, 2015, Nichols and Schaffer, 2007)3. Errors were 
estimated separately via the Webb’s six-point version of the wild clusters bootstrap (Cameron 
and Miller, 2015).   
 
Lastly, there was a potential measurement bias, as both the WUA performance and the response 
effectiveness scores were based on self-reports, and thus subject to cognitive and normative 
preconditions (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). We aimed to minimize the impact of those 
preconditions by using multiple survey items for each of the two variables. Just 50% and 25% of 
the farmers assessed all response effectiveness items and WUA performance items positively. 
 
 
   
 
                                                     
3 It is recommendable to specify clustering at the highest of all nested levels at which intra-cluster correlation in 
errors may be a problem, but there is a tradeoff: at higher levels the number of clusters will be smaller, so the 
asymptotic results for the estimator are less likely to hold (Nichols and Shaffer 2007). In this study, clustering at the 
valley level meant using too few clusters (just two); also, we were interested in assessing the valley effect. Clustering 
at the WUA level meant using 7 clusters, which fell within appropriate limits if the errors are estimated via the 
Webb’s six-point version of the wild clusters bootstrap (Cameron et al. 2015).  
